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💥Digital Dollar Likely Won't Be Part of Retail Banking World, US Lawmaker Says💥
September 21, 2022
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White House reports on central bank digital currencies "point the way" but Congress still has to pass legislation on these issues, Congressman Jim Himes told CoinDesk.

A U.S. central bank digital currency (CBDC) may be one step closer to reality after the White House published several reports analyzing the technical and policy aspects of a digital dollar last week. Congressman James Himes (D-Conn.) has been an outspoken advocate for a U.S. central bank digital currency, going so far as to publish a white paper on the issue in June 2022.

Himes, who chairs the House Financial Services Committee’s Subcommittee on National Security, International Development and Monetary Policy has also overseen a number of hearings on crypto assets and their role in national security and related issues.

The six-term Congressman spoke to CoinDesk after the White House, Treasury, Commerce and Justice Departments published half a dozen reports in response to U.S. President Joe Biden’s executive order on crypto on Sept. 16.

The following interview has been edited for clarity.

CoinDesk: Thank you so much for joining me. I really appreciate it.

Congressman Jim Himes: Yeah, happy to be with you.

I'm sure you must be busy and it's Friday, so let's get right into it. It's been a pretty intense day with the six reports published by the White House, as well as several federal agencies or departments today. But I know you in particular, have been talking about central bank digital currencies for quite a while now, and of course, you published a white paper titled “Winning the Future of Money,” I think in June, right, a few short months ago. What's your take on the multiple papers published today by the White House and the Treasury Department on this issue of central bank digital currencies?

The element of the various releases on central bank digital currency didn't break a lot of new ground. I was very happy to see that in the text, they sort of emphasize the importance of the United States not getting left behind technologically, I actually think that may be one of the more compelling reasons to continue, but it is a lot of work on the technological side, on the implementation side, making sure that if we do a CBDC, that it's really a very robust network with all of the safety considerations we would have.

I was glad to see they said, "let's keep cranking away." But, that's not enormously groundbreaking, I think. Overall, sort of when you move outside of just the narrow alley of central bank digital currency, I think the White House's releases were a good contribution to an effort that is really picking up very notable momentum in Washington.

I actually think the action is largely on Capitol Hill, in the Financial Services Committee on which I sit, there's a bipartisan effort to get a stablecoin bill put together. On the Senate side, you've got obviously a Agriculture Committee bill that would describe the authorities of the Commodity Futures Trading [Commission].

Where the rubber meets the road, I think Congress is making good progress. Now, not necessarily like we're going to pass new laws in the next couple of weeks progress, but you have to remember that two years ago, if you'd said “digital asset” or “cryptocurrency” in the halls of Congress, most people would look at you funny and not know what you were talking about. So I do think that there's been real progress on Capitol Hill.

Out of curiosity, have the reports today, or even just your own views on central bank digital currencies, have they evolved? Or where do you see any changes between what you've published, what the Fed is looking at, what Treasury published, and just this conversation in general that we’re hearing right now around CBDCs?

I think the story of the last couple of months has been one of the market re-instilling some rationality to the digital assets market. An awful lot of people have lost an awful lot of money, and that makes me sad, but – and when I say an awful lot of money, I mean you hear figures like $2 trillion thrown around, that's just a staggering amount of money. That says two things. Number one, clearly, people's desire to expose themselves to digital assets got way ahead of the underlying value, however you would wish to define that. And for that and other reasons, I think it's actually really good that Washington is beginning to focus hard.

Now, that doesn't mean that Washington is going to satisfy people. When you talk about digital assets, you've got points of view often extremely aggressively expressed, I'm here to tell you, ranging from the pure libertarian – total anonymity, untraceable, whatever – to the world of a central bank digital currency, where you see China actually operating what, my guess is, there's not a lot of privacy protection there.

You also have the interesting fact that we still don't have a digital asset that is proving to be a robust means of exchange, and it may be fun to contemplate questions like whether bitcoin is an appropriate asset class in your 401K. But where this will really be interesting for people is if and when it becomes a medium of exchange, and you can send money to South America or buy a consumer good in the UK, and obviously, we're not there yet.

To that point, do you think that the reports that we saw today are really doing enough to address these questions of usability and still maintaining some semblance of privacy, some semblance of not being a tool for just censorship or surveillance?

Yeah, I think they point the way. The language was pretty strong on urging the regulators to really take a firm hand with the more irresponsible behavior that we've seen. There are an awful lot of people buying into digital assets that are either imperfectly described, maybe that's a euphemism, where people really don't know what they're buying, to out and out fraud. Of course, the SEC and others have been pretty aggressive about going after the fraudsters

I think that the administration's releases point the way, but the real action, the real specifics aren't in those releases, right? The real action and the real specifics will ultimately be incorporated into legislation in the place where I work. And like I said, I'm gratified that there's been a lot of education, but I do think that the time is now to start to start moving something.

I'm very hopeful, for example, we're running out of time in this Congress, but I'm very hopeful that the Financial Services Committee might produce a stablecoin regulation bill, and … the Senate seems to be taking the lead on the jurisdictional questions of what regulator has authority over what product and hopefully, we'll make some real progress. And if we don't actually get anything done in this Congress in the few months remaining, then in the next Congress, we're in a position to do so.

Just jumping on that, do you think that the level of education is at a point now where once you're done with this stablecoin bill, and between you and me, I think the stablecoin bill sounds a lot like, between Libra, between the collapse of Terra/Luna, there's been a lot of stablecoin-specific action. Do you see other crypto issues, to the SEC and CFTC jurisdiction, for example, coming up and being something that we can see actual legislation on within the next maybe a year or two?

Yeah, absolutely. In fact, you already see it on the Senate side. It's not where I work, but on the Senate side, you already see the Senate Agriculture Committee defining the role for the CFTC, so you already see that happening. Again, I wouldn't anticipate – particularly with an election coming up in seven weeks or so – I wouldn't anticipate that that will pass. But this is how we start educating and discovering kind of what the various equities are.

I sometimes joke, this is a really interesting and important space, but it was introduced to the Congress in just about the most catastrophic way possible. And, of course, I'm referring to the hearings that the Financial Services Committee held on Libra. Prior to that, I don't know that many members of Congress had ever even considered the concept of a stablecoin or knew much about digital assets. I sometimes joke that if you had a bunch of evil lobbyists sitting around after a bottle of whiskey and saying, "what's the most catastrophic way to introduce the Congress to a concept," one guy would say, "well, give me [Meta (formerly Facebook) CEO Mark] Zuckerberg." And then let's have him talk about a pervasive global currency. I mean, it was just a catastrophe, right? That sort of soured an awful lot of people for no particularly good reason. I mean, I don't know that there's anything wrong with Mark Zuckerberg, I'm just saying that as a sort of presentational matter that may not have been the best introduction.

You've had a lot of work done since Libra to educate people. I am hopeful that in the next year or so, we may see a really serious stab at providing some regulatory clarity here.

Not to get into specifics here, but do you see any projects or any efforts out there – and feel free to not name specific names – but any projects that are kind of the counterexample to Libra? Ones that lawmakers can look at and say, "wow, okay, this makes sense, this is something that appeals to me, and this is helping me understand what you're trying to do better?’

I probably would not get in the business of predicting which models which stablecoins are likely to again cross that gap of becoming a common medium of exchange. We're not there yet, but there's no question in my mind that there's a use case there. Whether stablecoins are going to replace the current payment systems that are out there, everything from your debit card to Zelle and Venmo and all the various payments, I don't know, I'm a little skeptical about it. You don't you don't look at those current payment methodologies and say, "boy, this is really a pain in the neck.”

But, I have no doubt that two things are gonna happen. I sometimes draw an analogy, and maybe I'll be accused of being naive here, but I sometimes draw an analogy between the way we're thinking about crypto assets generally today, and the way we were thinking about the internet in, let's say 1996 or 1997. We sort of sensed that there was something there. There were all kinds of what, in retrospect, were absolutely wacky ideas. We're going to deliver cat food or kitty litter to your door for free, all these sorts of models that turned out to be sort of crazy. I'm not sure that we would have necessarily in the mid-90s predicted exactly what the internet was going to do. But lo and behold, it transformed our lives, really. I sort of feel like we're in a parallel moment like that.

If we sort of expand the aperture to blockchain generally, not just digital assets, there's no question in my mind that there's going to be some transformative aspects of it. But in the meantime, we're going to see a lot of nonsense, and we may not know that it's nonsense until an awful lot of people have lost a lot of money and in a non-common sense business model.

So I want to jump on something you said just now, referring to existing payment systems and tools, and this is kind of tying back to CBDCs, but the Fed recently announced that it's hoping to launch FedNow as a real time payment system within the next year. Given that, does the calculus around focusing on a central bank digital currency or digital dollar, is it the same? Or does it have to change now that the Fed is actually moving to be more active with this new system that you can argue solves a lot of the same kind of issues that digital dollar would try to solve?

Yeah, I think so. I think that's right, in the wholesale arena. I think that FedNow is probably a part of a really good, innovative modernization of our financial sector generally. It was not that long ago that trading 100 shares of stock was a $200 commission proposition with five days of closing, there's all kinds of risk associated with that. There's no reason for it, right? The only reason that transactions don't close instantaneously today is that the architecture doesn't support that. And so I do think FedNow is a really good step in the direction of where we want to be, which is taking out an awful lot of the time that used to be involved in the clearing and settlement of securities and currencies and commodities.

I think it's really good, but where I don't think we're going to go, I wouldn't say, "well, it's going to penetrate into the retail banking world." There are those who make the argument that individuals should be able to open an account at the Federal Reserve, or maybe they think it's a postal banking thing, a public banking thing. The idea of postal banking is certainly not unprecedented, and it's worth thinking about, I guess.

I do think that the notion that we're going to take the Federal Reserve, who already has massive regulatory duties, and by the way, needs to run our monetary policy and say, "now, you're going to be the banker to 320 million Americans," and in doing that, we're going to wipe out what is one of the primary competitive advantages of the United States, which is our banking sector, I think that's probably not likely. There may be those who think it's a good idea, but I think they're in a pretty small minority.

Fair enough. So something that I think is a little unique about your experience is you chaired the Subcommittee on National Security in House Financial Services and you're part of the Select Committee on Intelligence. Just looking to this idea through those lenses specifically, are there any maybe national security or national interest questions that you think a digital dollar could really address? Or just how are you looking at these questions or even the accessibility through those lenses?

I might add to your list too, I chair the Select Committee on Economic Disparity and if I can take you off course for one second, I get really excited about the possibility that digital assets could ultimately bring more people into a bank environment, or if not a bank environment, at least provide products and services that are cheaper and more relevant to more people.

So let's imagine a central bank digital currency exists. My intuition is, and it's only my intuition, is that it might have a special appeal because it's full faith and credit, it might have a special appeal to a percentage of Americans who are people in our country, by which I mean immigrants, who don't trust the banking system, who are skeptical of financial institutions, but if they believe that the money on their phone is full faith and credit, they might actually use it for payment, they might use it to do cheaper, money transfers, perhaps to family and other countries.

So I get pretty excited about the opportunity to expand in a cost effective way, services to people who are underserved, or if they are served, they're served by very high cost financial products. That's not your question, but let me come back to your question, which is that of course, I think that, like anything else, like any technological innovation, digital assets pose both opportunities and threats to our security. The obvious one that one talks about all the time is, anonymity poses some very serious issues. I mean, who really wants to use a fully anonymous payment mechanism? Yes, my libertarian friends want to use that because they don't want the, whatever the government knowing what they're doing.

But the other group of people who use that, of course, are those who are up to no good whether it's drug dealers or terrorists or human traffickers. So there's that and then there's also the interesting question and if you were British or Chinese or Korean, you would probably regard this differently than then I, that we regard it as Americans, which is the U.S. built SWIFT Network the clearing programs, the international payment mechanisms are one tool with which we are familiar and when we need to we can get visibility when and – this may be a particularly American thing – when you go before a judge and demonstrate probable cause you can actually access the information of those of whom you suspect breaking of breaking the law. That may not be true of other payment systems that are hosted or sponsored by other countries.

Editor’s note: Due to technical difficulties, Rep. Himes was asked to repeat his response to the final question.

An awful lot of people, the estimates are that 19% or so of Americans are unbanked or underbanked. Part of that, of course, is that a lot of people have suspicions about the big financial institutions and I'm intrigued by the possibility that a full faith and credit CBDC for example, might might offer the confidence that would cause somebody to use that as a payment mechanism or as a way to remit money to a home country or something like that. I do think there's real possibilities there, not to mention the possibilities that could be generated either by the private sector directly or by the private sector building on a digital token that was a full faith and credit card thing.

In the more traditional realm of national security there's what we always worry about, which is the question of anonymity if you have a payment system into which we have no visibility and that could be a foreign payment system or a payment system, which is deliberately obscured like what you see with some of these mixtures and such. There's, I think, two categories of people who really need anonymity. There's libertarians, who want that for their own reasons, and then there's, of course, people for whom anonymity is a professional necessity and that's the folks that are up to no good.

There may be others but obviously, we do not want a totally opaque means of payment that could be abused by terrorists or dealers or human traffickers. The other and the last thing I would say is to the point of transparency we're good in this country in terms of not abusing American civil rights or U.S. person civil rights, I should say, the distinction being that if you're in this country, regardless of if you’re a citizen or not, you're entitled to constitutional protection. We have a system that says that if you convince a judge that Sam is potentially committing a crime, that judge will give you permission to get evidence of that crime. There are plenty of countries where you wouldn't want that, because they don't care about civil rights. That's a pretty important part of our justice system here.

Lastly, I would just note we don't want technological developments to get radically away from us. The United States since World War II has been a technological leader in every realm, and we don't want to be – I suppose it's okay to be a fast follower, but we really don't want to be left behind by Chinese innovations or even European innovations. We may not worry about the Europeans as a foe, but every time I contemplate the possibility that we might not be at the technological forefront, it's sad.

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🎯What’s In Your Vault? — 2026 Edition🎯

Sixteen years ago, I posed a question that appeared to be about money but was never really about money at all. What's In Your Wallet? was written at a moment when the world remained intoxicated by the illusion that a representation of value and value itself were interchangeable. The distinction seemed trivial because the machinery of modern finance operated smoothly enough to conceal it. A bank balance purchased goods. A brokerage statement could be exchanged for assets. A warehouse receipt represented commodities. A title represented property. A promise represented delivery. The system functioned, and because it functioned, few bothered to examine the assumptions upon which it rested.

Yet beneath the smooth functioning of the machine lurked a subtle substitution. Somewhere along the way we ceased valuing the thing and began valuing the description of the thing. We stopped demanding possession and settled for evidence of possession. We became comfortable owning records instead of realities, claims instead of assets, promises instead of substance. The map became more important than the territory because most people never wandered far enough from the roads to discover that the two were not the same.

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Around the world, central banks have begun bringing gold home. Not merely purchasing gold, though that is certainly occurring, but repatriating it. Bullion that once rested comfortably in the vaults of London and New York is being moved into domestic custody. Public explanations invoke geopolitical uncertainty, sanctions exposure, strategic resilience, and sovereign security. None of those explanations are incorrect. They are simply incomplete. They describe the circumstances without illuminating the realization that appears to be driving the behavior.

A gold bar in your vault is not the same thing as a claim upon a gold bar in someone else's vault. Since the Templars in Jerusalem communicating with the courts of Europe, promises are not the thing that's promised. They never were.

For decades that distinction could be ignored because confidence in the system remained sufficiently high that possession appeared unnecessary. The custodians were trusted. The networks functioned. The legal frameworks appeared durable. The infrastructure seemed permanent. Under those conditions, claims and assets could masquerade as equivalents because the distance between them was rarely tested. Yet every system eventually encounters moments when assumptions become visible. The freezing of sovereign reserves reveals that ownership and access are not identical. Financial crises reveal that liquidity and solvency are not identical. Infrastructure failures reveal that existence and availability are not identical. Again and again reality intrudes upon abstraction and reminds us that the world beneath the ledger still matters.

This is why the movement of gold deserves more attention than the declarations of economists, politicians, central bankers, or global forums. The repatriation of gold is not fundamentally a commodity story, an inflation story, or even a monetary story. It is a custody story. It is a sovereignty story. It is an acknowledgment that possession remains the final court of appeal whenever confidence begins to wobble.

The irony is difficult to miss. At precisely the moment civilization celebrates digital currencies, tokenized assets, algorithmic settlement systems, cloud-based records, and increasingly abstract forms of ownership, many of the institutions responsible for preserving national wealth appear to be moving in the opposite direction. Public narratives race toward virtuality while institutional behavior quietly migrates toward physical custody. The speeches point toward digitization while the bullion trucks point toward reality.

Perhaps nowhere does this contradiction become more visible than when contemplating the fragility of the infrastructure upon which modern finance rests. We speak confidently of balances, portfolios, reserves, pensions, derivatives, and increasingly digital assets as though they possess an existence independent of the systems that record them. Yet the entire architecture rests upon a remarkably delicate foundation of electricity, communications, computation, synchronization, and trust. We have become so accustomed to continuity that we mistake continuity for permanence.

Consider not catastrophe but interruption. Consider a Carrington-scale solar event, a successful cyberattack, a cascading grid failure, or an electromagnetic pulse. The specific mechanism matters less than the principle. The lights go out. The servers stop responding. The networks cease synchronizing. The endless choreography of verification pauses. Legal claims may survive. Contracts may survive. Accounting entries may survive. Yet the practical ability to verify, transfer, access, or exercise those claims becomes uncertain. The abstractions remain theoretically intact while becoming functionally irrelevant.

Gold occupies a peculiar place within this thought experiment because it exists outside the thought experiment. It requires no password, no network connection, no authentication server, no intermediary, and no continuous electrical infrastructure to affirm its existence. The ledger may disappear. The gold remains. Whether one views gold as a monetary asset, a strategic reserve, or simply a historical curiosity, its persistence reveals something deeper about the nature of value itself. Assets that derive their existence from the systems that record them are fundamentally different from assets that exist independently of those systems.

What fascinates me, however, is not the rhetoric surrounding the so-called Great Reset, because the phrase itself has become one of the most effective distractions of the modern era. During the COVID years, populations were conditioned into increasingly reflexive forms of polarization in which every issue was immediately translated into opposing camps, every observation became a declaration of allegiance, and every question became a test of ideological loyalty. One side treated the Great Reset as evidence of a coordinated conspiracy while the other dismissed it as evidence of irrational paranoia. Both reactions produced the same outcome. Attention became fixed upon the slogan while remaining safely distant from the structure beneath it.

History has never required a committee to produce a reset. Resets emerge whenever claims become sufficiently detached from assets, whenever promises become sufficiently detached from productive capacity, whenever leverage becomes sufficiently detached from resilience, and whenever abstractions become sufficiently detached from reality. Long before a reset acquires a name, it exists as a tension embedded within the architecture itself.

This is why the most revealing actions in history are rarely the ones announced from podiums. They are the quiet movements that occur beneath the rhetoric. While populations argue over narratives, central banks move bullion. While commentators debate ideology, nations secure custody. While attention remains fixed upon political theater, the custodians of monetary power appear to be asking an older and more fundamental question concerning what survives when confidence falters, when access becomes uncertain, and when the systems responsible for recording ownership can no longer be assumed to function exactly as they did yesterday.

History repeatedly demonstrates that major transitions rarely emerge from the causes later assigned to them. Wars, sovereign defaults, financial crises, technological disruptions, infrastructure failures, and natural disasters frequently function as explanatory narratives that make visible contradictions that had already been accumulating for decades. The triggering event receives the blame because it is easier to understand than the architecture that rendered the event consequential. Yet the architecture is always where the real story resides. The event merely exposes what was already true.

Seen from this perspective, the most important question is not whether a particular organization intends to implement a Great Reset. The more important question concerns the conditions under which resets become inevitable. Whenever claims multiply faster than assets, whenever obligations expand faster than productive capacity, whenever financial abstractions drift sufficiently far from physical realities, tensions accumulate that eventually demand reconciliation. That reconciliation may arrive through inflation, restructuring, default, crisis, technological disruption, or events conveniently attributed to forces beyond human control, but the mechanism remains secondary to the principle. Reality eventually reasserts itself because reality is the only foundation upon which any abstraction can ultimately stand.

Viewed through that lens, the repatriation of gold appears less like a financial decision than an institutional acknowledgment that the distinction between claims and assets still matters. It represents a quiet recognition that resilience and possession acquire increasing importance precisely when complexity and uncertainty begin to rise. It suggests that beneath the public narratives, beneath the political theater, and beneath the endless distractions that dominate contemporary discourse, some of the world's most consequential actors may be asking the same question that inspired an essay sixteen years ago. What do you actually possess when the systems recording possession become uncertain?

The question is not fundamentally about gold. It is not fundamentally about vaults. It is not fundamentally about central banks. It is a question about the difference between a thing and a description of a thing, between ownership and access, between claims and assets, between abstractions and realities. It is the question that emerges whenever a civilization becomes sufficiently dependent upon representations that it forgets to examine the realities those representations are intended to describe.

Sixteen years ago I asked what was in your wallet. Watching nations quietly move bullion across oceans and into sovereign custody, the question feels sharper today than it did then. Not because the answer has changed, but because the institutions themselves appear increasingly unwilling to pretend that a claim and an asset are the same thing. The distinction sounded eccentric in 2010. It sounds increasingly obvious in 2026. The most interesting question is whether the rest of us will recognize the significance of that realization before history once again forces the issue on its own terms.

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⚠️90 DAYS WITHOUT THE GRID⚠️
Why Governments Are Preparing for Critical Systems to Fail

MIND BEND THEORY | DOCUMENTED INVESTIGATION

The United States is preparing major military installations to continue operating if civilian infrastructure goes down. Britain is telling households to prepare for days without essential services. India is warning that an attack on the financial system can weaken a nation. And the Bank of England is asking what happens when cyber defenses fail—not if they can prevent every attack.

Individually, each development has an explanation.

Put them beside one another, however, and a larger pattern becomes visible.

Over the span of only a few weeks, governments and financial authorities in the United States, United Kingdom and India have publicly discussed preparations for disruptions involving some of the systems modern society depends upon most:

Power.

Water.

Fuel.

Communications.

Banking.

Supply chains.

This does not establish that these governments are preparing for one secret event.

There is no public evidence of a coordinated countdown, predetermined blackout date or single intelligence warning connecting them.

But there is something here that can be documented.

Governments are increasingly planning around a question that sounds very different from traditional emergency preparedness:

What happens when the systems we normally assume will be available are no longer available?

And in the United States, that question has now reached the Pentagon.

DOCUMENT 01

UNITED STATES — FORTRESS AMERICA

On September 30, 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth established a program called FORTRESS America.

The acronym stands for:

Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy, Supply and Survivability.

The program addresses a vulnerability that rarely receives much public attention:

The world's most powerful military still depends extensively on civilian infrastructure.

Electric grids.

Commercial supply chains.

Communications infrastructure.

Fuel.

Foreign sources of critical materials.

FORTRESS America is intended to reduce those dependencies.

The Pentagon's own public description says the initiative is designed to ensure that major U.S. military installations generate independent power so that bases remain operational even if the civilian grid is taken down by cyberattack or sabotage.

It goes beyond electricity.

The program includes five major areas:

Energy independence

Installation hardening and cyber resilience

Supply-chain and defense-industrial-base resilience

Strategic defense reserves

Space and spectrum resilience

The Pentagon also wants deeper reserves of critical supplies so military operations can continue when ordinary supply lines are disrupted.

The underlying idea is simple:

The military should be capable of functioning even when the infrastructure surrounding it cannot.

An October 7 implementation memorandum obtained by DefenseScoop shows that the Pentagon had already begun establishing the FORTRESS America Program Office and assigning officials to implement those objectives.

Then another piece of the story emerged.

DOCUMENT 02

THE 90-DAY REQUIREMENT

On October 25, Fox News published details from additional FORTRESS America documents its reporters reviewed.

According to that reporting, major continental U.S. military installations are being prepared to sustain essential operations for at least 90 days without outside support.

The essential systems reportedly include:

Power.

Water.

Fuel.

Communications.

Think about the distinction carefully.

The Pentagon isn't telling Americans that the United States will lose electricity for 90 days.

It isn't predicting a 90-day blackout.

Military contingency planning deliberately prepares for scenarios officials hope never occur.

But preparing installations for this possibility tells us something about the scenario being considered.

The Pentagon is building resilience around the possibility that a sufficiently serious conflict or attack could interfere with the civilian systems on which military installations normally depend.

The publicly released FORTRESS material specifically discusses:

Cyberattack.

Sabotage.

Grid disruption.

Foreign supply-chain disruption.

Attacks against installations.

And prolonged military contingencies.

That makes the 90-day requirement significant—but it must be described accurately.

Mind Bend Theory verification note:

The September 30 FORTRESS America program itself is documented publicly.

The October 7 implementation memorandum has been reported and described by DefenseScoop.

The 90-day requirement, however, currently comes from documents reviewed by Fox News, rather than a primary 90-day document independently published for the public.

That distinction matters.

We follow the documents as far as they take us—and no farther.

DOCUMENT 03

UNITED KINGDOM — BE READY FOR THREE DAYS

Now cross the Atlantic.

On October 22, the British government launched its new Be Ready campaign.

This time the audience wasn't the military.

It was ordinary households.

The UK government is asking households that are able to do so to prepare to remain self-sufficient for approximately three days during an emergency.

The government specifically discusses disruptions affecting:

Power.

Water.

Phones.

Internet access.

A Parliamentary Written Statement issued the same day explicitly states:

“The updated advice calls on households to be self-sufficient for three days in the case of an emergency.”

The government recommends maintaining three days of bottled water and non-perishable food.

Its expanded preparedness guidance includes:

Approximately three litres of drinking water per person per day

Three days of non-perishable food

Battery-powered or wind-up radio

Torch and spare batteries

Charged power bank

Essential medications

First-aid supplies

Blankets and warm clothing

Important telephone numbers written down

Basic hygiene supplies

Cash

Why cash?

Because during some disruptions, electronic payment systems and ATMs may not function normally.

That creates an important connection between infrastructure and finance.

Electricity isn't isolated from banking.

Communications aren't isolated from payments.

Modern infrastructure is interconnected.

And failure can move through those connections.

DOCUMENT 04

INDIA — “WARS ARE NOT FOUGHT WITH WEAPONS ALONE”

Three days later, on October 25, another statement appeared.

This one came from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Modi was inaugurating the Reserve Bank of India's newly established Data Centre and Cybersecurity Training Institute in Bhubaneswar.

The facilities are designed to strengthen the technological foundations and cybersecurity resilience of India's financial system.

Four data centres will host mission-critical payment and settlement systems.

But Modi's explanation of why this matters went beyond ordinary cybersecurity.

His official statement says:

“Nowadays, wars are not fought with weapons alone; a nation can also be weakened by attacking its economy.”

He continued by saying India's growing economy requires its banking system to be protected against cyber looters and cyber terrorists.

That puts another critical system into the picture:

Money.

A modern economy depends on digital banking infrastructure almost as heavily as it depends on electricity and telecommunications.

Payment systems move commerce.

Banks hold liquidity.

Settlement systems move money between financial institutions.

Data centres keep those networks functioning.

Disrupt the financial infrastructure badly enough and the consequences don't remain inside banks.

They reach businesses.

Supply chains.

Payroll.

Purchasing.

Markets.

And households.

DOCUMENT 05

BANK OF ENGLAND — WHAT IF CYBER DEFENSE FAILS?

There is another document worth reading.

On June 30, Bank of England Deputy Governor Sarah Breeden delivered a speech titled:

“Agents of Change.”

The subject was artificial intelligence and financial stability.

One section deserves particular attention.

Breeden warned that advanced AI systems are becoming increasingly capable of identifying and chaining together cyber vulnerabilities.

That changes the nature of cyber risk.

AI can help defenders.

But the same capabilities can potentially increase the speed and effectiveness of attackers.

The important change in thinking comes afterward.

Preventing attacks is no longer enough.

Financial institutions must also prepare to recover after a successful attack.

Breeden raised the possibility of simultaneous disruption across multiple financial firms.

She then asked whether critical financial institutions may eventually require completely separate failover capabilities—or even the ability to rebuild compromised core systems from “bare metal.”

In October, Reuters reported that the Bank of England was pushing financial institutions further toward this type of recovery planning.

That represents a subtle but significant change in the question.

It isn't simply:

How do we stop the attack?

It's becoming:

What happens if we don't?

And:

How do we keep the system functioning afterward?

CONNECT THE DOCUMENTS

Now put the documents beside one another.

UNITED STATES

Military installations are being hardened so essential operations can continue when civilian infrastructure is disrupted.

UNITED KINGDOM

Households are being told to prepare for three days without services they normally assume will remain available.

INDIA

The prime minister publicly warns that modern conflict can weaken a country by attacking its economy and calls for stronger protection of banking infrastructure.

BANK OF ENGLAND

Financial authorities are examining recovery scenarios in which cyber defenses have already failed and multiple institutions could potentially be disrupted simultaneously.

These aren't identical programs.

They aren't even aimed at the same people.

And there is currently no public evidence demonstrating that they were coordinated.

But they share one important assumption:

CRITICAL SYSTEMS CAN FAIL.

And resilience therefore cannot begin after the failure occurs.

It has to exist beforehand.

THE SYSTEM BEHIND THE SYSTEM

This is where the story becomes bigger than individual announcements.

Modern infrastructure isn't a collection of isolated systems.

It's a network.

Consider what happens when electricity fails.

Without power, telecommunications eventually become difficult to maintain.

Without communications, electronic payments can be affected.

Fuel pumps require electricity.

Water systems depend on pumping and treatment infrastructure.

Businesses depend on payment processing.

Supply chains depend on communications, transportation and fuel.

Hospitals require electricity, communications, water, medicine and logistics simultaneously.

A serious disruption doesn't necessarily remain inside the system where it started.

It can propagate.

POWER → COMMUNICATIONS → BANKING → COMMERCE → SUPPLY CHAINS

And the dependency runs in multiple directions.

That interconnectedness is precisely why governments plan for resilience.

WHAT THIS DOES NOT PROVE

Mind Bend Theory exists to examine unusual patterns.

But a pattern isn't automatically proof of a conspiracy.

There is currently no public evidence showing that Washington, London and New Delhi are secretly preparing for the same scheduled event.

There is no verified date for a coming global blackout.

There is no public document establishing an imminent 90-day collapse of the American electrical grid.

And the Pentagon's 90-day military resilience requirement should not be interpreted as a prediction that Americans will lose electricity for 90 days.

That would go beyond the evidence.

What the evidence actually establishes is interesting enough.

Governments increasingly consider disruption of power, communications, supply chains and financial infrastructure plausible enough to justify concrete preparation.

The UK is preparing households.

The United States is hardening military infrastructure.

India is strengthening the technological backbone of its financial system.

The Bank of England is thinking about how banks recover after cyber defenses fail.

That isn't speculation.

It's in the documents.

THE QUESTION

Perhaps the most important change isn't what governments believe will happen.

It's what they're preparing to survive.

For decades, infrastructure security focused heavily on preventing failure.

The emerging model looks different:

Assume something eventually gets through.

Assume something eventually goes down.

Build the ability to continue operating anyway.

The Pentagon calls that resilience.

The UK calls it being ready.

Central banks call it operational resilience.

Different terminology.

Same fundamental question:

WHAT STILL WORKS WHEN THE SYSTEM DOESN'T?

DOCUMENT TRAIL

Read the Evidence Yourself

Mind Bend Theory strongly encourages readers to examine the original material rather than relying solely on our interpretation.

🇺🇸 DOCUMENT 01 — FORTRESS America Establishment

September 30, 2026

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's memorandum establishes FORTRESS America as a Department of Defense resilience program.

The publicly reported memorandum establishes the program around installation resilience, independent energy, strategic reserves, supply chains and related national-defense infrastructure.

Source type: Pentagon memorandum / official announcement.

🇺🇸 DOCUMENT 02 — FORTRESS America Implementation Memorandum

October 7, 2026

DefenseScoop obtained the memorandum from Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Michael Duffey directing officials to begin operationalizing the FORTRESS America Program Office.

It identifies five foundational pillars, including energy independence, installation hardening and cyber resilience, strategic reserves and supply-chain resilience.

Source type: Pentagon memorandum obtained by DefenseScoop.

🇺🇸 DOCUMENT 03 — 90-Day FORTRESS Requirement

October 25, 2026

Fox News reports that documents it reviewed require major continental U.S. installations to sustain essential operations for at least 90 days without outside support.

Source type: Journalistic reporting based on documents reviewed by reporters.

Important: This is not currently being presented by Mind Bend Theory as a publicly released primary 90-day Pentagon document.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 04 — UK Cabinet Office Be Ready Announcement

October 22, 2026

The Cabinet Office announces the three-year Be Ready campaign and describes preparation for disruption affecting power, water, phones and internet.

Source type: Official UK government publication.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 05 — Parliamentary Written Statement HCWS409

October 22, 2026

The UK Parliament records the government's explicit recommendation that households prepare to remain self-sufficient for three days.

Source type: Official Parliamentary record.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 06 — Be Ready Household Emergency Checklist

The government's practical household guidance provides recommendations for water, food, radio, lighting, medication, power banks, emergency cash and other supplies.

Source type: Official UK government preparedness guidance.

🇮🇳 DOCUMENT 07 — Prime Minister of India / RBI Cybersecurity Facilities

October 25, 2026

Official statement documenting the opening of the Reserve Bank of India's Data Centre and Cybersecurity Training Institute and Modi's warning that countries can be weakened through attacks against their economies.

Source type: Official Government of India statement.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 08 — “Agents of Change” — Sarah Breeden

June 30, 2026

The Bank of England deputy governor discusses rapidly advancing AI cyber capabilities, simultaneous disruption across financial institutions, separate failover infrastructure and potentially rebuilding compromised systems from bare metal.

Source type: Official Bank of England speech.

DOCUMENT 09 — Bank of England Cyber-Recovery Reporting

October 15, 2026

Reuters reports on the Bank of England's push for stronger recovery capabilities against AI-enabled cyberattacks, including bare-metal recovery.

Source type: Independent reporting.

MIND BEND THEORY

Follow the documents. Separate what they prove from what they don't.

Then ask why the preparation is happening now.

Documents attached to the investigation

FORTRESS America — Sept. 30 memorandum record
Pentagon FORTRESS America implementation memorandum — DefenseScoop
FORTRESS America 90-day documents — Fox News investigation
UK Cabinet Office — Be Ready announcement
UK Parliament — Written Statement HCWS409
India PM's Office — RBI Data Centre & Cybersecurity Training Institute
Bank of England — Sarah Breeden, “Agents of Change”
Reuters — Bank of England cyber-recovery warning

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September 13, 2026
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Revolut Leak Shows the Cost of Constant ID Collection
Revolut’s mistake is the news, but the bigger problem is the growing number of companies being encouraged or required to keep copies of our most sensitive identity documents.

Online bank Revolut has revealed that it gave out sensitive personal and financial information of an undisclosed number of its customers in response to a fake government request.

The information that was handed over to an “unauthorized third party” reportedly includes names, dates of birth, occupations, addresses, phone numbers, account numbers, transaction histories (including Bitcoin), and even copies of government-issued IDs and onboarding verification selfies.

Revolut claims that derived biometric face data was not.

The company said that the data was handed over in response to an email that came from a real government agency’s domain, but was not actually sent or authorized by that agency.

The email passed several authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC) that are designed to establish the authenticity of a message’s origin and integrity, but do not verify the legitimacy of the legal request itself.

Revolut said that it complied with the request “under the reasonable belief that it was an authentic government agency request” – and only later found out that it was not.

Revolut said it later realized its mistake, blocked the email address, and reported the incident to the relevant authorities.

Revolut said that only a “limited” number of its customers were affected by the data leak, and that the company’s systems were not hacked, nor was any money stolen.

The story broke on September 11 when Revolut customers started receiving an email notice about a data leak, and the news was picked up by media outlets the following day.

Revolut notice explaining customer identity and financial data was shared after an unauthorized government email request.

The reason this is a recurring problem is that companies are keeping highly sensitive information about their customers’ identities, and sometimes even financial transactions, for a long time, and this data is then available to be disclosed to third parties – either in response to valid legal requests, or, as in the case of Revolut, fake ones.

One reason for this is know your customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) rules. Revolut’s current UK customer privacy notice spells it out: the company generally keeps personal data of UK customers for no more than seven years after the relationship ends, and sometimes longer – for legal reasons.

This means that even if you close your account, your identity documents don’t disappear.

And while the incident with Revolut happened in the financial sector, it’s by no means the only one that requires customers to hand over sensitive identity information. Discord, a popular chat service, said in an October 9, 2025 security update that government ID photos of approximately 70,000 users may have been exposed after a third-party customer service provider got hacked.

This was not a financial service, nor the same type of attack. But the result was similar – because the underlying business process was the same: requiring and storing sensitive identity documents. In the case of Discord, these were used to review age-related appeals.

It’s hard to do anything about a copy of your old passport, or a photo of your face, or a record of your past transactions. These can be used to identify and profile you, and can be used to carry out targeted fraud. And this can happen even if the initial disclosure didn’t result in financial loss.

The more companies are forced to collect and store such information, and the more of it they have, the more opportunities there are for this data to be leaked, either by the company itself or a third party it works with. That's what makes governments' push for more ID checks just to access ordinary parts of life so reckless.

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