Dinarian888
News • Business • Investing & Finance
💥The Cosmos Endgame💥
It's Ethereum vs Cosmos. Which blockchain has the better endgame?
October 13, 2022
post photo preview

 

Merge, Surge, Splurge... Converge?

The Interchain Endgames of Cosmos and Ethereum

Towards the end of the Silurian period 420 million years ago, jawed fish diverged into cartilaginous sharks (and rays), and their more rigid cousins, the bony fish. 

These latter produced the amphibians, some of whom crawled out to conquer the land and the air as dinosaurs and proto-mammals. 375 million years later, a few of them returned to the sea, becoming dolphins and whales as they converged again on the familiar hydrodynamic strategies of a propulsive tail, flippers, and light bones, this time as warm-blooded, air-breathing mammals.

  

A short history of Cosmos and Ethereum

Divergence: In 2013-14, Cosmos and Ethereum split off from their common blockchain ancestor, Bitcoin. But as both projects have iterated on their own respective roadmaps, their endgames have begun to converge on multiple, connected execution zones.

Though the Cosmos design still favors sovereignty at the app level, Ethereum has become increasingly modular, preferring to trade this freedom for universal security and settlement. Ethereum’s monolithic structure allowed composable smart contracts to be launched and iterated upon at great speed, the necessary preconditions for the first great flowering of DeFi applications.

Its great success allowed it to develop solutions to many blockchain problems, and it has made considerable progress on two of the space’s most persistent problems: scaling and maximal-extractable-value (MEV). Ethereum devs have pushed the technological and definitional limits of single-chain scaling, and they have brought the dark forest of block producer transaction reordering into the light. 

At the same time, Cosmos ceded the winner-take-most race of becoming the world’s financial AOL (siloed precursor to the world wide web), in order to instead develop a secure, flexible backbone for the internet of money.

It pioneered three pluggable, adaptable technologies:

  1. A replicable state machine with Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus (Tendermint).

  2. A set of blockchain application modules (the Cosmos SDK) that interact with the consensus engine.

  3. Together these can be used to quickly spin up an immediately interoperable blockchain using the crown jewel of Cosmos: the Inter-Blockchain Communication Protocol. 

IBC is both a trust-minimized data transport layer for communicating between chains, and an interchain app-layer built on top. The most obvious application is token transfers, but an increasing array of Interchain Standards is allowing more complex cross-chain interactions such as Interchain Queries, Interchain Accounts (allowing accounts on one chain to control accounts on others), and Interchain Security, the sharing of validator power between chains.

These IBC functions are online and just coming into wide use, setting the stage for fully composable DeFi between chains. 

Convergence: From these radically different approaches, Cosmos and Ethereum are now beginning to converge once more, as each adapts to the ever-changing crypto environment. 

On one hand, Cosmos is superficially beginning to resemble Ethereum at the app-layer, which is a fulfillment of the Cosmos roadmap, rather than an architectural change. With IBC now connected to some 50 chains, and CosmWasm smart contracting spreading throughout the ecosystem, applications are proliferating in a variety of ways: as single-use blockchains, as general smart-contracting zones, and as curated, multi-team application suites like the Osmosis decentralized exchange. 

As interchain DeFi begins to flourish, it makes sense that many of the first applications have been ported over from the most successful Ethereum applications. But many chains are doing things only possible on a sovereign chain, and apps that start as clones do so largely as a bootstrapping mechanism, achieving product-market fit while developing improvements that are only possible on appchains.

On the other hand, Ethereum is looking decidedly more like Cosmos in its design.

With the Merge complete, it is now Proof of Stake like Tendermint chains. More importantly, the original Ethereum 2.0 vision of sharded execution has long been de-prioritized in favor of rollups, quasi-appchains designed to move the majority of transactions off Ethereum’s main layer. The most recently announced parts of the Ethereum scaling roadmap–the surge (data sharding), verge (statelessness), purge (state expiry and cleanup), and splurge (account abstraction, proposer-builder separation, verifiable delay functions)–all support this rollup-centric model.

In his Endgame post late last year, Vitalik imagined three possible scaling futures for Ethereum: no rollups, a single dominant rollup, or a continuation of the current multi-rollup scenario, which we have circled in red.

  

Because they essentially act like appchains, it seems likely that many rollups will continue to thrive simultaneously.

Since each rollup has attracted its own developers, apps, investors, and users, each has begun to develop its own unique communitarian identity and its own business development. For now, each rollup is a tax-paying, protected commonwealth within the greater Ethereum federalist state, but the most successful, having had a taste of the sovereign appchain experience, may eventually want more control of their protocols, at which time they could easily become full-fledged interconnected appchains with access to the entirety of the interchain. 

The Cosmos Appchain Thesis

Why would an app or a rollup want to become an appchain instead?

The fundamental value proposition is sovereign interoperability. 

Because they are sovereign, appchains have precise control over their entire stack: execution, consensus, block size and timing, state and mempool logic, rollups, fees, the smart contract environment, validator requirements, governance rules, and any other area of blockchain structure and operations they might want to customize. 

Because they are interoperable, appchains can freely and composably interact with each other over IBC.  

What do appchains do with all this power?

They optimize for user experience, fine-tuning the access that front-ends and wallets like Keplr have to blockchain data and mechanisms, and adjusting protocol-level logic to make execution faster, easier, and more productive. They secure the chain as they see fit, recruiting their own validators to implement code, produce blocks, relay transactions, and more, or borrowing security from another validator set with interchain security (Q1 2023).

Ultimately, most appchains will choose to mix these two options: chains will share their validator sets with each other, and the entire interchain will become a shared defense zone, shielded with the armor of mesh security. 

Many appchain innovations knit security and UX together. Osmosis, for instance, has developed “superfluid staking,” a substantial improvement to Proof-of-Stake that allows liquidity providers to stake the underlying tokens in their LP shares to help secure the chain, thereby also earning staking rewards in addition to LP rewards. Currently only the OSMO token benefits from this increased capital efficiency, but pending improvements to Tendermint (the BFT-tolerant state machine replication software at the heart of many Cosmos chains) will enable other appchains to opt in to superfluid-staking on Osmosis or allow OSMO to be superfluid-staked on their chain.

Soon, the whole interchain will be able to put its staked assets to work in DeFi without incurring the centralization and chain security risks of traditional liquid staking derivatives.   

Appchains also excel at handling MEV: the profits available to whoever has the power to decide transaction ordering and block inclusion. MEV has plagued DeFi users across all ecosystems, but appchains can more quickly develop on-chain solutions that greatly reduce malicious MEV and redirect healthy arbitrage profits from third parties to themselves.  

For example, Osmosis is developing a private mempool with threshold decryption (an idea that Ethereum is experimenting with too). These private transactions cannot be seen by nodes until after they are executed, making front-running much more difficult as well as allowing limit orders and other future/contingent transactions to be put on-chain privately. Similarly, appchains can reserve the first slot in their blocks for protocol-controlled arbitrage and liquidations: a necessity for the health of lending and trading protocols, but which on monolithic chains tends to become an MEV game, leaking value from the app to third parties. Osmosis will instead be directing these healthy, non-user-harming arb profits back to the DAO.

The remaining (much-reduced) MEV can also be partially captured in-app by auctioning off the second slot in the block to MEV searchers–like Flashbots, but on-chain. Alternatively, it may make sense for chains to let all these second-slot auctions be aggregated in one place, as the Cosmos Hub proposes to do, so that the cross-chain MEV market is transparent and not a dark forest.

Appchains allow for radical blockchain experiments to be carried out quickly. While Tendermint and the Cosmos SDK are amazing technologies that allow apps to quickly spin up IBC-ready blockchains, the whole Cosmos stack is not necessary to become an IBC-connected appchain. Many compelling Cosmos ecosystem projects are building or adopting alternative consensus or state-machines that better fit their needs, including Penumbra (private trading), Anoma (universal coincidence-of-wants coordination), and Nomic (Bitcoin on Cosmos). 

Appchains are not definitionally different to monolithic chains; rather, appchain modularity is largely the philosophy of sovereign interoperability combined with the trust-minimized blockchain communication of IBC.

Monolithic chains, by contrast, have generally adopted the so-called fat-protocol thesis, in which a single chain runs the vast majority of DeFi worldwide, and everything settles to one layer whose token accrues a monetary premium. Scaling such a protocol is very difficult, as we know, and heroic efforts continue to be put into exciting technologies that speed up and modularize execution, storage, data availability, and the like.

Rollups, which are amazing technical achievements, have so far acted as enclaved appchains without sovereignty or interoperability, though they of course benefit from Ethereum’s massive security. By the same token (no pun intended), while appchains do not yet generally have the blockspace constraints of monolithic chains, they will be able to adopt modular solutions like rollups and data availability layers when it becomes necessary.

The Cosmos thesis predicted the appchain future, allowing it to shard execution into separate blockchains by design, giving app builders the freedom to develop their own products and to experiment freely with all layers of the stack to do so.

At the same time, the appchain vision assumed the inevitability of cross-chain bridging years before everyone else and developed by far the most comprehensive and safest system for interchain blockchain communication in an age where cross-chain bridge hacks are commonplace.

The Safety of IBC

One of the potentially strongest arguments against the appchain thesis is that bridges are inherently unsafe. On one hand, it is true that no protocol or interchain messaging system is inherently and at all times safe, but this is as true of Ethereum contracts as it is of IBC.

Any code can have bugs, and adversaries will always try to exploit them.

On the other hand, we have gathered enough evidence since DeFi summer that users are simply never going to confine themselves to a single chain–they will use a hilariously exploitable multi-sig just to get cross-chain to the latest cookie-cutter EVM clone.

How much more eager will they be to use the fully interoperable, UX optimized, composable DeFi of IBC and the interchain? 

If bridges are inevitable, why is IBC the best? Why should it be considered safe enough to be the future of finance? The answer lies in the trust-minimized design.

Participating chains run light clients of each other, meaning that they each independently verify the block headers of the other chain. An attacker therefore cannot convince another chain with a lie about what happened on one blockchain unless they take over the whole chain. If that were to happen, the party controlling the chain could potentially infinite-mint its own chain’s tokens, pass them over IBC, and use them to steal funds on an AMM or through another DeFi mechanism. 

This is in stark contrast to bridges whose tokens are held in an exploitable contract (multi-sig or otherwise), and which have not traditionally permitted generalized message-passing (though the Axelar appchain has made strides in improving non-IBC cross-chain communication).

It is therefore important that appchains establish IBC connections with reputable, secure chains. However, it is also true that the vulnerability window from an attacking IBC-connected chain is quite small. First, if a chain is taken over by economic or governance attack, or if it catastrophically fails, IBC connections can be immediately closed, meaning that it cannot siphon any value away.

To cover the short amount of time before the IBC connection is closed, IBC rate-limiting will shortly be available. This will allow appchains to restrict the token flow over a given period, allowing normal activity while limiting the value that an attacking chain can take, making the economic calculus of any attack far less favorable.

   

IBC in Practice: The above image (live, interactive version here) shows IBC sends and receives between IBC-connected chains, with the icons sized proportionally by transaction volume. Even in this bear market, in the past 30 days, roughly 800k transactions and $264m worth of value have been sent over IBC. Note that this is only cross-chain activity; it does not count single-chain transactions.

Still, it is no secret that Cosmos does not yet have Ethereum-like adoption. Technical challenges remain for interchain DeFi to reach its full potential–though we are starting to see their likely shape in the mesh of Interchain Security, encrypted mempools, protocol-controlled arbitrage, and synchronous blockspace auctions.

As interchain adoption picks up, appchains that need to scale will also have access to the full array of rollup and other scaling solutions being developed on Ethereum, as well modularizing appchains like Celestia.

ATOM 2.0: Monolithic-chain Benefits for the Interchain 

We discussed above how Ethereum has become more Cosmos-like over the years. In its recent ATOM 2.0 whitepaper, the Cosmos Hub has proposed to offer several Ethereum-like, ecosystem-wide use cases.

The Cosmos Hub was so named because it was the first appchain of the Cosmos ecosystem, a proof-of-concept for the Cosmos SDK, as well as a Schelling point and funding source for interchain developers, investors, and users.

However, because ATOM holders strongly believed that the Cosmos philosophy of rent-free sovereign interoperability was the only viable way to build the interchain future, the Hub ended up without an obvious use case. ATOM 2.0 changes that, not by radically altering the Cosmos, but by specializing the Hub as an ecosystem service-chain.

What follows is a brief general overview of the most compelling parts of the ATOM 2.0 proposal.

1️. Interchain Scheduler

Perhaps the most innovative use-case for the Hub, the Scheduler is a proposed market for synchronous cross-chain blockspace. The idea is that appchains will let the Hub tokenize and sell the first or second slots in their blocks (depending on whether the appchain executes its own arbitrage and liquidations at the top of the block).

Profits will be shared between the Hub and the originating chain.

Because Tendermint block proposers are deterministically chosen, both MEV searchers and applications will know when cross-chain blocks are synchronous, and these blocks will fetch higher prices than if they were auctioned off on the home appchain.

More importantly, the Scheduler acts as an on-chain interchain Flashbots, allowing cross-chain MEV to occur in the light where it can be studied and mitigated, instead of off-chain in the dark forest. Further, these synchronous cross-chain blocks may be valuable to many DeFi applications because they will allow for immediate, atomic, final execution on multiple blockchains simultaneously. It is also possible that this cross-chain synchrony will develop more robustly through interchain mesh security.

2️. Interchain Security

We discussed mesh security above. Under the ATOM 2.0 proposal, the Cosmos Hub will provide Interchain Security v1.

In this first form, a provider chain will allow its validator set to provide plug-and-play security for consumer chains that do not want the responsibility of recruiting and managing their own validators. Interchain Security v1 is a logical extension to the Cosmos SDK, making it easier than ever to spin up a new chain, as long as the application does not mind paying the security provider and does not need the flexibility and sovereignty of its own validator set. Notably, Interchain Security v1 was attractive to Circle, which will be releasing native USDC into the interchain from a Hub-secured asset-issuance chain as soon as Q1 2023.

Even in v1 of Interchain Security, any appchain can be a security provider if it finds a willing consumer for its security.

However, chains cannot simultaneously provide and consume security from each other in the amount of their choosing, which in v2/v3 of Interchain Security, is what will allow for the Internet of Blockchains to have shared, opt-in mesh security. In its final mesh security form, Interchain Security acts as another point of convergence between Cosmos and Ethereum, enabling the interchain to achieve a more flexible, self-sovereign version of the sort of monolithic, protocol-level security currently provided by Ethereum. 

3️. Interchain Allocator

Broadly speaking, the Hub intends to use its well-funded treasury to continue to invest in promising ecosystem projects, driving value back to ATOM.

That treasury will be replenished predominantly with fees from the Scheduler’s synchronous blockspace auctions, and from Interchain Security payments. If the investments are made well, they will themselves return extra value to the treasury. If these revenue streams provide sufficient ongoing value to stakers, ATOM inflation will be cut to zero, a move aimed at giving ATOM sound money properties in the vein of ETH and BTC, properties which have hitherto been reserved for monolithic L1s.

If all these services are adopted as planned, the Hub can stay true to its roots as a non-extractive booster of the whole ecosystem, earning fees only to the extent that it is providing valuable services. The value-accrual mechanisms should enable ATOM to retain its value as a strong ecosystem collateral, one of the bases for decentralized interchain stablecoins

Appchains: Hubs and Outposts

For the moment, blockchain activity has settled into a number of semi-fluid ecosystems.

These zones are loosely interconnected now with a patchwork of bridges and centralized exchanges, but IBC can safely interconnect them all–though developing cost-effective light clients for some chains is still a work in progress. 

Both appchains and apps on monolithic chains have been positioning themselves for an increasingly interconnected future. With ad hoc cross-chain bridging now decidedly out of favor, it makes sense for most apps to adopt a hub and outpost model, rather than relying on name recognition or trying to establish a lasting technical moat while constrained by protocol-level decisions beyond their control.

This hub and outpost model can take different forms. In all its forms, the hub is the home of the appchain, running governance, holding the treasury, and coordinating among the outposts. One of the main questions going forward with IBC is how liquidity is best handled. For Osmosis, at least for the moment, it makes sense to house all of its liquidity at home and have its outposts route flows from other chains through the Osmosis blockchain. But Mars Protocol, which is working closely with Osmosis to launch its first lending outpost on Osmosis, plans for each of its outposts to have separate liquidity.

It is up to different appchains to weigh the trade-offs between splitting their liquidity, which may lead to poor execution, and the need for fully synchronous transactions, which power traders sometimes demand and which IBC cannot yet provide. That said, as the mesh security of the interchain grows, and as a market grows for synchronous blocks between chains, and as IBC develops in ways we cannot yet predict, fully synchronous interchain DeFi transactions will inevitably become available.

The Endgame

Cosmos and Ethereum have always been philosophically close, each drawing heavily on the original cypherpunk ethos for inspiration. While Ethereum set out to push the monolithic chain hypothesis as far as it would go, and Cosmos chose instead to maximize sovereign interoperability, it should perhaps not be surprising that many of their design choices have begun to converge again as they approach their Endgames.

The line between a rollup and an appchain is becoming increasingly thin, as evidenced by dYdX’s decision to move from one to the other–while holding out the possibility that they might move back to a rollup in the future (See the podcast dYdX founder Antonio Juliano on leaving Ethereum here).

Other apps are likely to spin off their own appchains, possibly while retaining Ethereum as their premier outposts.

Interoperability (of a limited, insecure sort) long ago came to Ethereum to stay: once a light client is available, Ethereum itself will be able to connect to the interchain more securely by using IBC, another sovereign, interoperable member of the broader ecosystem we all share.

Link

community logo
Join the Dinarian888 Community
To read more articles like this, sign up and join my community today
0
What else you may like…
Videos
Podcasts
Posts
Articles
🎬 The investment opportunity in Bittensor 🎬

@Briandixon06, CEO of Off The Chain Capital, and @GrantCardone discuss the investment opportunity in Bittensor.

$TAO 🌐 WYKYK 😉

00:02:06
The Genie Is Out Of The Bottle 👀

JUST IN: 🇺🇸 Former CFTC Chairman Chris Giancarlo says "the genie is out of the bottle" on crypto, and it’s going to consume the entire financial system 👀

"Wall Street itself is now adopting digital network technology as its very architecture." 🚀

00:00:31
⚠️‼️BANK CEO CONFIRMS THE FEDERAL RESERVE DELAYED HIS BANK FROM FLIPPING THE SWITCH TO CRYPTO‼️⚠️

‼️BANK CEO CONFIRMS THE FEDERAL RESERVE DELAYED HIS BANK FROM FLIPPING THE SWITCH TO CRYPTO‼️

Mike Ring, CEO of Old Glory Bank, explains on the record why his bank's crypto platform has not launched.💯

"So why have we not FLIPPED THE SWITCH and made this available?"🙇‍♂️

Old Glory Bank built NextGen Banking. One bank account with crypto built in.

Customers link their digital assets inside the bank and move between dollars and the blockchain.🌐

The launch was ready. A deal was in place for July 2026 with more than enough capital behind it.

The Federal Reserve cancelled it at the last minute.🔻

"The Fed hates crypto. They do not want a bank like Old Glory Bank to be able to provide you, Main Street, an easy way to get on and off the blockchain."☝️

However, the bank is prepared with a plan B.🔒

A new deal is in place and this one does NOT need the Federal Reserve.😉

"We're doing a deal that does not require Federal Reserve approval. They are not going to stop us. They cannot ...

00:03:04
🚨 Chutes is being framed as a Hyperliquid-style breakout for decentralized AI inference, with live revenue, verified GPU infrastructure, and a direct challenge to centralized cloud AI 🚨

Chutes is gaining attention as a decentralized AI inference platform that claims to combine real usage, cryptographic verification, confidential computing, and open-source infrastructure into a working production system. The thesis is simple: instead of trusting Big Tech clouds with AI workloads, users get a distributed compute layer built around verification and privacy.

🔑 Key points

🔹 Chutes is live in production and reportedly scaled to more than 1,170 active GPU nodes, including large numbers of Nvidia H200s and Blackwell-class hardware.

🔹 The platform says it has processed nearly 38 trillion tokens since launch across 53 deployed applications and more than 700,000 registered users.

🔹 The team reportedly cut unprofitable usage programs, reduced total token volume, and still improved revenue efficiency, with revenue per GPU rising sharply after removing subsidized traffic.

🔹 Chutes is using post-quantum cryptography, trusted execution environments, and Nvidia confidential ...

🚨 Chutes is being framed as a Hyperliquid-style breakout for decentralized AI inference, with live revenue, verified GPU infrastructure, and a direct challenge to centralized cloud AI 🚨
🚨 JPMorgan’s criticism of the CLARITY Act is fueling a fresh power struggle over who gets to write America’s crypto rules 🚨

A new clash is emerging between legacy finance and crypto legislation after JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon reportedly warned that the CLARITY Act could let crypto firms offer bank-like products without bank-level oversight. The dispute is quickly turning into a larger fight over regulation, competitiveness, and who controls the future architecture of digital finance in the United States.

🔑 Key points

🔹 Jamie Dimon reportedly called the CLARITY Act a threat to the financial system, arguing it could allow crypto firms to offer yield-like products while avoiding the capital, reserve, and oversight burdens traditional banks face.

🔹 Senator Cynthia Lummis pushed back publicly, framing the issue as a global strategic race and warning that if the U.S. does not set digital asset standards, other powers will.

🔹 The core tension is whether the bill creates legitimate regulatory clarity or simply opens the door to regulatory arbitrage for crypto platforms operating outside the traditional banking...

🚨 JPMorgan’s criticism of the CLARITY Act is fueling a fresh power struggle over who gets to write America’s crypto rules 🚨
👉 Coinbase just launched an AI agent for Crypto Trading

Custom AI assistants that print money in your sleep? 🔜

The future of Crypto x AI is about to go crazy.

👉 Here’s what you need to know:

💠 'Based Agent' enables creation of custom AI agents
💠 Users set up personalized agents in < 3 minutes
💠 Equipped w/ crypto wallet and on-chain functions
💠 Capable of completing trades, swaps, and staking
💠 Integrates with Coinbase’s SDK, OpenAI, & Replit

👉 What this means for the future of Crypto:

1. Open Access: Democratized access to advanced trading
2. Automated Txns: Complex trades + streamlined on-chain activity
3. AI Dominance: Est ~80% of crypto 👉txns done by AI agents by 2025

🚨 I personally wouldn't bet against Brian Armstrong and Jesse Pollak.

👉 Coinbase just launched an AI agent for Crypto Trading
Its More Like AI Is The Biggest Risk To The Deep States Secrets 😉

🤖 AI tops the Fed survey’s financial-system risk concerns

A Federal Reserve survey found that AI-related risks have become the most frequently cited concern among respondents. The worries span a potential market correction, cybersecurity threats, and complex financing tied to the AI boom.

🔑 Key points

🔹 AI concerns climbed sharply: 87% of surveyed contacts cited AI as a salient risk, up from 50% in the spring survey.

🔹 Valuations could face pressure: Respondents warned that high AI-related stock valuations could fall if company earnings disappoint.

🔹 Cybersecurity threats are growing: Concerns include attacks by sophisticated state actors and potential damage caused by frontier AI models.

🔹 Financing structures add exposure: Survey participants also flagged risks from complex forms of AI-related financing.

🔹 Survey scope matters: The findings reflect views from 23 market contacts surveyed in September and October—not a prediction that a crisis will occur.

🔎 Why it matters...

This is insanity... 🤯

💳 Average credit card APR remains near 25%💳

Forbes Advisor’s weekly tracker puts the average credit card APR at 24.88% as of November 9, 2026. That’s a database average—not necessarily the rate you’ll be offered, since APR varies by card and borrower.

🔑 Key points

🔹 Different averages measure different things: The Federal Reserve reported 22.36% for accounts that were accruing interest as of August 2026. That figure uses a different measure and time period, so it isn’t a direct comparison with Forbes’ card-offer database.

🔹 Carrying a balance gets expensive: In Forbes’ example, a $7,500 balance with $200 monthly payments takes 63 months to repay at 22% APR, with $4,970 in interest. At 28%, it takes 86 months and costs $9,643 in interest.

🔹 Your own rate may differ: Credit score, card type, and other financial factors can affect the APR you receive.

🔹 Paying in full avoids purchase interest: If your card has a grace period and you pay the statement balance...

post photo preview
⚠️ The War On Everyone ⚠️
post photo preview
🎯What’s In Your Vault? — 2026 Edition🎯

Sixteen years ago, I posed a question that appeared to be about money but was never really about money at all. What's In Your Wallet? was written at a moment when the world remained intoxicated by the illusion that a representation of value and value itself were interchangeable. The distinction seemed trivial because the machinery of modern finance operated smoothly enough to conceal it. A bank balance purchased goods. A brokerage statement could be exchanged for assets. A warehouse receipt represented commodities. A title represented property. A promise represented delivery. The system functioned, and because it functioned, few bothered to examine the assumptions upon which it rested.

Yet beneath the smooth functioning of the machine lurked a subtle substitution. Somewhere along the way we ceased valuing the thing and began valuing the description of the thing. We stopped demanding possession and settled for evidence of possession. We became comfortable owning records instead of realities, claims instead of assets, promises instead of substance. The map became more important than the territory because most people never wandered far enough from the roads to discover that the two were not the same.

Reading those observations in 2026 feels less like revisiting an old essay and more like observing a fault line that has slowly widened beneath the surface of the global financial order. What has changed is not the distinction itself. What has changed is that the institutions most responsible for maintaining the abstraction appear increasingly unwilling to trust it.

Around the world, central banks have begun bringing gold home. Not merely purchasing gold, though that is certainly occurring, but repatriating it. Bullion that once rested comfortably in the vaults of London and New York is being moved into domestic custody. Public explanations invoke geopolitical uncertainty, sanctions exposure, strategic resilience, and sovereign security. None of those explanations are incorrect. They are simply incomplete. They describe the circumstances without illuminating the realization that appears to be driving the behavior.

A gold bar in your vault is not the same thing as a claim upon a gold bar in someone else's vault. Since the Templars in Jerusalem communicating with the courts of Europe, promises are not the thing that's promised. They never were.

For decades that distinction could be ignored because confidence in the system remained sufficiently high that possession appeared unnecessary. The custodians were trusted. The networks functioned. The legal frameworks appeared durable. The infrastructure seemed permanent. Under those conditions, claims and assets could masquerade as equivalents because the distance between them was rarely tested. Yet every system eventually encounters moments when assumptions become visible. The freezing of sovereign reserves reveals that ownership and access are not identical. Financial crises reveal that liquidity and solvency are not identical. Infrastructure failures reveal that existence and availability are not identical. Again and again reality intrudes upon abstraction and reminds us that the world beneath the ledger still matters.

This is why the movement of gold deserves more attention than the declarations of economists, politicians, central bankers, or global forums. The repatriation of gold is not fundamentally a commodity story, an inflation story, or even a monetary story. It is a custody story. It is a sovereignty story. It is an acknowledgment that possession remains the final court of appeal whenever confidence begins to wobble.

The irony is difficult to miss. At precisely the moment civilization celebrates digital currencies, tokenized assets, algorithmic settlement systems, cloud-based records, and increasingly abstract forms of ownership, many of the institutions responsible for preserving national wealth appear to be moving in the opposite direction. Public narratives race toward virtuality while institutional behavior quietly migrates toward physical custody. The speeches point toward digitization while the bullion trucks point toward reality.

Perhaps nowhere does this contradiction become more visible than when contemplating the fragility of the infrastructure upon which modern finance rests. We speak confidently of balances, portfolios, reserves, pensions, derivatives, and increasingly digital assets as though they possess an existence independent of the systems that record them. Yet the entire architecture rests upon a remarkably delicate foundation of electricity, communications, computation, synchronization, and trust. We have become so accustomed to continuity that we mistake continuity for permanence.

Consider not catastrophe but interruption. Consider a Carrington-scale solar event, a successful cyberattack, a cascading grid failure, or an electromagnetic pulse. The specific mechanism matters less than the principle. The lights go out. The servers stop responding. The networks cease synchronizing. The endless choreography of verification pauses. Legal claims may survive. Contracts may survive. Accounting entries may survive. Yet the practical ability to verify, transfer, access, or exercise those claims becomes uncertain. The abstractions remain theoretically intact while becoming functionally irrelevant.

Gold occupies a peculiar place within this thought experiment because it exists outside the thought experiment. It requires no password, no network connection, no authentication server, no intermediary, and no continuous electrical infrastructure to affirm its existence. The ledger may disappear. The gold remains. Whether one views gold as a monetary asset, a strategic reserve, or simply a historical curiosity, its persistence reveals something deeper about the nature of value itself. Assets that derive their existence from the systems that record them are fundamentally different from assets that exist independently of those systems.

What fascinates me, however, is not the rhetoric surrounding the so-called Great Reset, because the phrase itself has become one of the most effective distractions of the modern era. During the COVID years, populations were conditioned into increasingly reflexive forms of polarization in which every issue was immediately translated into opposing camps, every observation became a declaration of allegiance, and every question became a test of ideological loyalty. One side treated the Great Reset as evidence of a coordinated conspiracy while the other dismissed it as evidence of irrational paranoia. Both reactions produced the same outcome. Attention became fixed upon the slogan while remaining safely distant from the structure beneath it.

History has never required a committee to produce a reset. Resets emerge whenever claims become sufficiently detached from assets, whenever promises become sufficiently detached from productive capacity, whenever leverage becomes sufficiently detached from resilience, and whenever abstractions become sufficiently detached from reality. Long before a reset acquires a name, it exists as a tension embedded within the architecture itself.

This is why the most revealing actions in history are rarely the ones announced from podiums. They are the quiet movements that occur beneath the rhetoric. While populations argue over narratives, central banks move bullion. While commentators debate ideology, nations secure custody. While attention remains fixed upon political theater, the custodians of monetary power appear to be asking an older and more fundamental question concerning what survives when confidence falters, when access becomes uncertain, and when the systems responsible for recording ownership can no longer be assumed to function exactly as they did yesterday.

History repeatedly demonstrates that major transitions rarely emerge from the causes later assigned to them. Wars, sovereign defaults, financial crises, technological disruptions, infrastructure failures, and natural disasters frequently function as explanatory narratives that make visible contradictions that had already been accumulating for decades. The triggering event receives the blame because it is easier to understand than the architecture that rendered the event consequential. Yet the architecture is always where the real story resides. The event merely exposes what was already true.

Seen from this perspective, the most important question is not whether a particular organization intends to implement a Great Reset. The more important question concerns the conditions under which resets become inevitable. Whenever claims multiply faster than assets, whenever obligations expand faster than productive capacity, whenever financial abstractions drift sufficiently far from physical realities, tensions accumulate that eventually demand reconciliation. That reconciliation may arrive through inflation, restructuring, default, crisis, technological disruption, or events conveniently attributed to forces beyond human control, but the mechanism remains secondary to the principle. Reality eventually reasserts itself because reality is the only foundation upon which any abstraction can ultimately stand.

Viewed through that lens, the repatriation of gold appears less like a financial decision than an institutional acknowledgment that the distinction between claims and assets still matters. It represents a quiet recognition that resilience and possession acquire increasing importance precisely when complexity and uncertainty begin to rise. It suggests that beneath the public narratives, beneath the political theater, and beneath the endless distractions that dominate contemporary discourse, some of the world's most consequential actors may be asking the same question that inspired an essay sixteen years ago. What do you actually possess when the systems recording possession become uncertain?

The question is not fundamentally about gold. It is not fundamentally about vaults. It is not fundamentally about central banks. It is a question about the difference between a thing and a description of a thing, between ownership and access, between claims and assets, between abstractions and realities. It is the question that emerges whenever a civilization becomes sufficiently dependent upon representations that it forgets to examine the realities those representations are intended to describe.

Sixteen years ago I asked what was in your wallet. Watching nations quietly move bullion across oceans and into sovereign custody, the question feels sharper today than it did then. Not because the answer has changed, but because the institutions themselves appear increasingly unwilling to pretend that a claim and an asset are the same thing. The distinction sounded eccentric in 2010. It sounds increasingly obvious in 2026. The most interesting question is whether the rest of us will recognize the significance of that realization before history once again forces the issue on its own terms.

Source

🙏To support my work, Helping to keep the signal high and the noise low:

👉 Cashapp: $thedinarian

👉 Buy me a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/thedinarian

👉 PayPal: Scan the QR code below 📲 or Click Here: 

👇 Crypto Donations 👇

XRP: r9pid4yrQgs6XSFWhMZ8NkxW3gkydWNyQX
XLM: GDMJF2OCHN3NNNX4T4F6POPBTXK23GTNSNQWUMIVKESTHMQM7XDYAIZT
XDC: xdcc2C02203C4f91375889d7AfADB09E207Edf809A6

Read full Article
post photo preview
⚠️90 DAYS WITHOUT THE GRID⚠️
Why Governments Are Preparing for Critical Systems to Fail

MIND BEND THEORY | DOCUMENTED INVESTIGATION

The United States is preparing major military installations to continue operating if civilian infrastructure goes down. Britain is telling households to prepare for days without essential services. India is warning that an attack on the financial system can weaken a nation. And the Bank of England is asking what happens when cyber defenses fail—not if they can prevent every attack.

Individually, each development has an explanation.

Put them beside one another, however, and a larger pattern becomes visible.

Over the span of only a few weeks, governments and financial authorities in the United States, United Kingdom and India have publicly discussed preparations for disruptions involving some of the systems modern society depends upon most:

Power.

Water.

Fuel.

Communications.

Banking.

Supply chains.

This does not establish that these governments are preparing for one secret event.

There is no public evidence of a coordinated countdown, predetermined blackout date or single intelligence warning connecting them.

But there is something here that can be documented.

Governments are increasingly planning around a question that sounds very different from traditional emergency preparedness:

What happens when the systems we normally assume will be available are no longer available?

And in the United States, that question has now reached the Pentagon.

DOCUMENT 01

UNITED STATES — FORTRESS AMERICA

On September 30, 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth established a program called FORTRESS America.

The acronym stands for:

Federal Operations for Resilience, Troop Resources, Energy, Supply and Survivability.

The program addresses a vulnerability that rarely receives much public attention:

The world's most powerful military still depends extensively on civilian infrastructure.

Electric grids.

Commercial supply chains.

Communications infrastructure.

Fuel.

Foreign sources of critical materials.

FORTRESS America is intended to reduce those dependencies.

The Pentagon's own public description says the initiative is designed to ensure that major U.S. military installations generate independent power so that bases remain operational even if the civilian grid is taken down by cyberattack or sabotage.

It goes beyond electricity.

The program includes five major areas:

Energy independence

Installation hardening and cyber resilience

Supply-chain and defense-industrial-base resilience

Strategic defense reserves

Space and spectrum resilience

The Pentagon also wants deeper reserves of critical supplies so military operations can continue when ordinary supply lines are disrupted.

The underlying idea is simple:

The military should be capable of functioning even when the infrastructure surrounding it cannot.

An October 7 implementation memorandum obtained by DefenseScoop shows that the Pentagon had already begun establishing the FORTRESS America Program Office and assigning officials to implement those objectives.

Then another piece of the story emerged.

DOCUMENT 02

THE 90-DAY REQUIREMENT

On October 25, Fox News published details from additional FORTRESS America documents its reporters reviewed.

According to that reporting, major continental U.S. military installations are being prepared to sustain essential operations for at least 90 days without outside support.

The essential systems reportedly include:

Power.

Water.

Fuel.

Communications.

Think about the distinction carefully.

The Pentagon isn't telling Americans that the United States will lose electricity for 90 days.

It isn't predicting a 90-day blackout.

Military contingency planning deliberately prepares for scenarios officials hope never occur.

But preparing installations for this possibility tells us something about the scenario being considered.

The Pentagon is building resilience around the possibility that a sufficiently serious conflict or attack could interfere with the civilian systems on which military installations normally depend.

The publicly released FORTRESS material specifically discusses:

Cyberattack.

Sabotage.

Grid disruption.

Foreign supply-chain disruption.

Attacks against installations.

And prolonged military contingencies.

That makes the 90-day requirement significant—but it must be described accurately.

Mind Bend Theory verification note:

The September 30 FORTRESS America program itself is documented publicly.

The October 7 implementation memorandum has been reported and described by DefenseScoop.

The 90-day requirement, however, currently comes from documents reviewed by Fox News, rather than a primary 90-day document independently published for the public.

That distinction matters.

We follow the documents as far as they take us—and no farther.

DOCUMENT 03

UNITED KINGDOM — BE READY FOR THREE DAYS

Now cross the Atlantic.

On October 22, the British government launched its new Be Ready campaign.

This time the audience wasn't the military.

It was ordinary households.

The UK government is asking households that are able to do so to prepare to remain self-sufficient for approximately three days during an emergency.

The government specifically discusses disruptions affecting:

Power.

Water.

Phones.

Internet access.

A Parliamentary Written Statement issued the same day explicitly states:

“The updated advice calls on households to be self-sufficient for three days in the case of an emergency.”

The government recommends maintaining three days of bottled water and non-perishable food.

Its expanded preparedness guidance includes:

Approximately three litres of drinking water per person per day

Three days of non-perishable food

Battery-powered or wind-up radio

Torch and spare batteries

Charged power bank

Essential medications

First-aid supplies

Blankets and warm clothing

Important telephone numbers written down

Basic hygiene supplies

Cash

Why cash?

Because during some disruptions, electronic payment systems and ATMs may not function normally.

That creates an important connection between infrastructure and finance.

Electricity isn't isolated from banking.

Communications aren't isolated from payments.

Modern infrastructure is interconnected.

And failure can move through those connections.

DOCUMENT 04

INDIA — “WARS ARE NOT FOUGHT WITH WEAPONS ALONE”

Three days later, on October 25, another statement appeared.

This one came from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Modi was inaugurating the Reserve Bank of India's newly established Data Centre and Cybersecurity Training Institute in Bhubaneswar.

The facilities are designed to strengthen the technological foundations and cybersecurity resilience of India's financial system.

Four data centres will host mission-critical payment and settlement systems.

But Modi's explanation of why this matters went beyond ordinary cybersecurity.

His official statement says:

“Nowadays, wars are not fought with weapons alone; a nation can also be weakened by attacking its economy.”

He continued by saying India's growing economy requires its banking system to be protected against cyber looters and cyber terrorists.

That puts another critical system into the picture:

Money.

A modern economy depends on digital banking infrastructure almost as heavily as it depends on electricity and telecommunications.

Payment systems move commerce.

Banks hold liquidity.

Settlement systems move money between financial institutions.

Data centres keep those networks functioning.

Disrupt the financial infrastructure badly enough and the consequences don't remain inside banks.

They reach businesses.

Supply chains.

Payroll.

Purchasing.

Markets.

And households.

DOCUMENT 05

BANK OF ENGLAND — WHAT IF CYBER DEFENSE FAILS?

There is another document worth reading.

On June 30, Bank of England Deputy Governor Sarah Breeden delivered a speech titled:

“Agents of Change.”

The subject was artificial intelligence and financial stability.

One section deserves particular attention.

Breeden warned that advanced AI systems are becoming increasingly capable of identifying and chaining together cyber vulnerabilities.

That changes the nature of cyber risk.

AI can help defenders.

But the same capabilities can potentially increase the speed and effectiveness of attackers.

The important change in thinking comes afterward.

Preventing attacks is no longer enough.

Financial institutions must also prepare to recover after a successful attack.

Breeden raised the possibility of simultaneous disruption across multiple financial firms.

She then asked whether critical financial institutions may eventually require completely separate failover capabilities—or even the ability to rebuild compromised core systems from “bare metal.”

In October, Reuters reported that the Bank of England was pushing financial institutions further toward this type of recovery planning.

That represents a subtle but significant change in the question.

It isn't simply:

How do we stop the attack?

It's becoming:

What happens if we don't?

And:

How do we keep the system functioning afterward?

CONNECT THE DOCUMENTS

Now put the documents beside one another.

UNITED STATES

Military installations are being hardened so essential operations can continue when civilian infrastructure is disrupted.

UNITED KINGDOM

Households are being told to prepare for three days without services they normally assume will remain available.

INDIA

The prime minister publicly warns that modern conflict can weaken a country by attacking its economy and calls for stronger protection of banking infrastructure.

BANK OF ENGLAND

Financial authorities are examining recovery scenarios in which cyber defenses have already failed and multiple institutions could potentially be disrupted simultaneously.

These aren't identical programs.

They aren't even aimed at the same people.

And there is currently no public evidence demonstrating that they were coordinated.

But they share one important assumption:

CRITICAL SYSTEMS CAN FAIL.

And resilience therefore cannot begin after the failure occurs.

It has to exist beforehand.

THE SYSTEM BEHIND THE SYSTEM

This is where the story becomes bigger than individual announcements.

Modern infrastructure isn't a collection of isolated systems.

It's a network.

Consider what happens when electricity fails.

Without power, telecommunications eventually become difficult to maintain.

Without communications, electronic payments can be affected.

Fuel pumps require electricity.

Water systems depend on pumping and treatment infrastructure.

Businesses depend on payment processing.

Supply chains depend on communications, transportation and fuel.

Hospitals require electricity, communications, water, medicine and logistics simultaneously.

A serious disruption doesn't necessarily remain inside the system where it started.

It can propagate.

POWER → COMMUNICATIONS → BANKING → COMMERCE → SUPPLY CHAINS

And the dependency runs in multiple directions.

That interconnectedness is precisely why governments plan for resilience.

WHAT THIS DOES NOT PROVE

Mind Bend Theory exists to examine unusual patterns.

But a pattern isn't automatically proof of a conspiracy.

There is currently no public evidence showing that Washington, London and New Delhi are secretly preparing for the same scheduled event.

There is no verified date for a coming global blackout.

There is no public document establishing an imminent 90-day collapse of the American electrical grid.

And the Pentagon's 90-day military resilience requirement should not be interpreted as a prediction that Americans will lose electricity for 90 days.

That would go beyond the evidence.

What the evidence actually establishes is interesting enough.

Governments increasingly consider disruption of power, communications, supply chains and financial infrastructure plausible enough to justify concrete preparation.

The UK is preparing households.

The United States is hardening military infrastructure.

India is strengthening the technological backbone of its financial system.

The Bank of England is thinking about how banks recover after cyber defenses fail.

That isn't speculation.

It's in the documents.

THE QUESTION

Perhaps the most important change isn't what governments believe will happen.

It's what they're preparing to survive.

For decades, infrastructure security focused heavily on preventing failure.

The emerging model looks different:

Assume something eventually gets through.

Assume something eventually goes down.

Build the ability to continue operating anyway.

The Pentagon calls that resilience.

The UK calls it being ready.

Central banks call it operational resilience.

Different terminology.

Same fundamental question:

WHAT STILL WORKS WHEN THE SYSTEM DOESN'T?

DOCUMENT TRAIL

Read the Evidence Yourself

Mind Bend Theory strongly encourages readers to examine the original material rather than relying solely on our interpretation.

🇺🇸 DOCUMENT 01 — FORTRESS America Establishment

September 30, 2026

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's memorandum establishes FORTRESS America as a Department of Defense resilience program.

The publicly reported memorandum establishes the program around installation resilience, independent energy, strategic reserves, supply chains and related national-defense infrastructure.

Source type: Pentagon memorandum / official announcement.

🇺🇸 DOCUMENT 02 — FORTRESS America Implementation Memorandum

October 7, 2026

DefenseScoop obtained the memorandum from Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment Michael Duffey directing officials to begin operationalizing the FORTRESS America Program Office.

It identifies five foundational pillars, including energy independence, installation hardening and cyber resilience, strategic reserves and supply-chain resilience.

Source type: Pentagon memorandum obtained by DefenseScoop.

🇺🇸 DOCUMENT 03 — 90-Day FORTRESS Requirement

October 25, 2026

Fox News reports that documents it reviewed require major continental U.S. installations to sustain essential operations for at least 90 days without outside support.

Source type: Journalistic reporting based on documents reviewed by reporters.

Important: This is not currently being presented by Mind Bend Theory as a publicly released primary 90-day Pentagon document.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 04 — UK Cabinet Office Be Ready Announcement

October 22, 2026

The Cabinet Office announces the three-year Be Ready campaign and describes preparation for disruption affecting power, water, phones and internet.

Source type: Official UK government publication.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 05 — Parliamentary Written Statement HCWS409

October 22, 2026

The UK Parliament records the government's explicit recommendation that households prepare to remain self-sufficient for three days.

Source type: Official Parliamentary record.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 06 — Be Ready Household Emergency Checklist

The government's practical household guidance provides recommendations for water, food, radio, lighting, medication, power banks, emergency cash and other supplies.

Source type: Official UK government preparedness guidance.

🇮🇳 DOCUMENT 07 — Prime Minister of India / RBI Cybersecurity Facilities

October 25, 2026

Official statement documenting the opening of the Reserve Bank of India's Data Centre and Cybersecurity Training Institute and Modi's warning that countries can be weakened through attacks against their economies.

Source type: Official Government of India statement.

🇬🇧 DOCUMENT 08 — “Agents of Change” — Sarah Breeden

June 30, 2026

The Bank of England deputy governor discusses rapidly advancing AI cyber capabilities, simultaneous disruption across financial institutions, separate failover infrastructure and potentially rebuilding compromised systems from bare metal.

Source type: Official Bank of England speech.

DOCUMENT 09 — Bank of England Cyber-Recovery Reporting

October 15, 2026

Reuters reports on the Bank of England's push for stronger recovery capabilities against AI-enabled cyberattacks, including bare-metal recovery.

Source type: Independent reporting.

MIND BEND THEORY

Follow the documents. Separate what they prove from what they don't.

Then ask why the preparation is happening now.

Documents attached to the investigation

FORTRESS America — Sept. 30 memorandum record
Pentagon FORTRESS America implementation memorandum — DefenseScoop
FORTRESS America 90-day documents — Fox News investigation
UK Cabinet Office — Be Ready announcement
UK Parliament — Written Statement HCWS409
India PM's Office — RBI Data Centre & Cybersecurity Training Institute
Bank of England — Sarah Breeden, “Agents of Change”
Reuters — Bank of England cyber-recovery warning

Source

🙏To support my work, Helping to keep the signal high and the noise low:

👉 Cashapp: $thedinarian

👉 Buy me a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/thedinarian

👉 PayPal: Scan the QR code below 📲 or Click Here: 

👇 Crypto Donations 👇

XRP: r9pid4yrQgs6XSFWhMZ8NkxW3gkydWNyQX
XLM: GDMJF2OCHN3NNNX4T4F6POPBTXK23GTNSNQWUMIVKESTHMQM7XDYAIZT
XDC: xdcc2C02203C4f91375889d7AfADB09E207Edf809A6

Read full Article
September 13, 2026
post photo preview
Revolut Leak Shows the Cost of Constant ID Collection
Revolut’s mistake is the news, but the bigger problem is the growing number of companies being encouraged or required to keep copies of our most sensitive identity documents.

Online bank Revolut has revealed that it gave out sensitive personal and financial information of an undisclosed number of its customers in response to a fake government request.

The information that was handed over to an “unauthorized third party” reportedly includes names, dates of birth, occupations, addresses, phone numbers, account numbers, transaction histories (including Bitcoin), and even copies of government-issued IDs and onboarding verification selfies.

Revolut claims that derived biometric face data was not.

The company said that the data was handed over in response to an email that came from a real government agency’s domain, but was not actually sent or authorized by that agency.

The email passed several authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC) that are designed to establish the authenticity of a message’s origin and integrity, but do not verify the legitimacy of the legal request itself.

Revolut said that it complied with the request “under the reasonable belief that it was an authentic government agency request” – and only later found out that it was not.

Revolut said it later realized its mistake, blocked the email address, and reported the incident to the relevant authorities.

Revolut said that only a “limited” number of its customers were affected by the data leak, and that the company’s systems were not hacked, nor was any money stolen.

The story broke on September 11 when Revolut customers started receiving an email notice about a data leak, and the news was picked up by media outlets the following day.

Revolut notice explaining customer identity and financial data was shared after an unauthorized government email request.

The reason this is a recurring problem is that companies are keeping highly sensitive information about their customers’ identities, and sometimes even financial transactions, for a long time, and this data is then available to be disclosed to third parties – either in response to valid legal requests, or, as in the case of Revolut, fake ones.

One reason for this is know your customer (KYC) and anti-money laundering (AML) rules. Revolut’s current UK customer privacy notice spells it out: the company generally keeps personal data of UK customers for no more than seven years after the relationship ends, and sometimes longer – for legal reasons.

This means that even if you close your account, your identity documents don’t disappear.

And while the incident with Revolut happened in the financial sector, it’s by no means the only one that requires customers to hand over sensitive identity information. Discord, a popular chat service, said in an October 9, 2025 security update that government ID photos of approximately 70,000 users may have been exposed after a third-party customer service provider got hacked.

This was not a financial service, nor the same type of attack. But the result was similar – because the underlying business process was the same: requiring and storing sensitive identity documents. In the case of Discord, these were used to review age-related appeals.

It’s hard to do anything about a copy of your old passport, or a photo of your face, or a record of your past transactions. These can be used to identify and profile you, and can be used to carry out targeted fraud. And this can happen even if the initial disclosure didn’t result in financial loss.

The more companies are forced to collect and store such information, and the more of it they have, the more opportunities there are for this data to be leaked, either by the company itself or a third party it works with. That's what makes governments' push for more ID checks just to access ordinary parts of life so reckless.

Source

🙏To support my work, Helping to keep the signal high and the noise low:

👉 Cashapp: $thedinarian

👉 Buy me a coffee: https://buymeacoffee.com/thedinarian

👉 PayPal: Scan the QR code below 📲 or Click Here: 

👇 Crypto Donations 👇

XRP: r9pid4yrQgs6XSFWhMZ8NkxW3gkydWNyQX
XLM: GDMJF2OCHN3NNNX4T4F6POPBTXK23GTNSNQWUMIVKESTHMQM7XDYAIZT
XDC: xdcc2C02203C4f91375889d7AfADB09E207Edf809A6

Read full Article
See More
Available on mobile and TV devices
google store google store app store app store
google store google store app tv store app tv store amazon store amazon store roku store roku store
Powered by Locals