As part of theĀ Bank of EnglandāsĀ central bank digital currency (CBDC) design phase, it explored anĀ offline CBDCĀ for itsĀ digital pound. At this stage it was only interested in technology issues, so it tested solutions provided byĀ Thales,Ā Secretarium,Ā IDEMIAĀ Secure Transactions, Quali-Sign andĀ Consult Hyperion. It concluded the solutions were technically capable of delivering final payments, but found challenges relating to usability and the prevention and detection of counterfeits and double spending.
Offline usability challenges
The first challenge was that theĀ offline and online CBDC balances are kept separateĀ in the wallet, which users might find odd given they donāt care about the technical ramifications. Sometimes wifi outages can catch a user off guard. But if they havenāt already moved money into the offline balance, they wonāt be able to use the offline functionality unless someone else pays them offline.
Offline payments tend to use secure elements either on a smartphone, a special SIM or smart cards. Given they haveĀ limited storage capacity, this caps the number of transactionsĀ that are possible before reconnecting to the network. One of the solutions tested was particularly limited on this front.
Imposing transaction limitsĀ in order to address potential risks has the side effect of impacting usability. And they are often not practical. For example, any kind of time limits are challenging because smart cards donāt have clocks. On smartphones the time on the clock might be changed. An alternative is to limit the number of transactions, if the secure element is compromised the transaction count could be manipulated. Although in that case, the CBDC has a problem anyway, because the private keys are also likely to be vulnerable.
Preventing and detecting fraud
The primary line of defense against counterfeiting and double spending is the cryptographic keys used within the secure element of the device. However, if somehow these are compromised, thereās a need to detect this has happened.
After executing a transaction offline, when the device is within wifi range itĀ subsequently performs a reconciliation with the online ledgerĀ to highlight fraud or double spending. However, this is after the fact, so it doesnāt prevent double spending.
Devices canĀ keep transaction records for later reconciliation. The possibilities are to keep full transaction records, partial records or no records, which renders the transactions anonymous. The Bank of England observed that without transaction records to reconcile with the online ledger, itās not possible to detect counterfeits and double spending at all. And even when records are kept, the intermediaries need to share the records with each other for detection purposes. VariousĀ privacy preserving technologiesĀ were tested to safeguard personal information.
Additionally, the trials tested having a centralized system for uploading offline transaction data, using confidential computing to protect personal data. That allowed additional checks, including for money laundering.
The paper concluded that the trialsĀ ādemonstrated that it might be technically feasible to implement an offline payment functionality for a digital poundĀ but there are security, performance, and user experience challenges which need to be explored further.ā
Hence, two major areas where work is needed is for double spending and fraud checks, and what happens if the secure element is compromised. While secure elements are widely used for payments, they are usually combined with simultaneous online checks.
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